User:Sinanshi
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About me
[编辑]参与编撰的条目
[编辑]哲学
[编辑]历史
[编辑]遷徙新大陸模型--04/2013（进度10%）
生态学
[编辑]Character
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早期思想
[编辑]As a philosopher with a mathematical background, Husserl was interested in developing a general theory of inferential systems, which (following Bolzano) he conceived of as a theory of science, on the ground that every science (including mathematics) can be looked upon as a system of propositions that are interconnected by a set of inferential relations. Following John S. Mill, he argues in Logical Investigations that the best way to study the nature of such propositional systems is to start with their linguistic manifestations, i.e., (sets of) sentences and (assertive) utterances thereof. 胡塞尔早年研究致力于数理哲学和科学哲学。 胡塞尔的理论指出，所有科学，包括数学可以被看作是一个推论系统，其中所有的命题都互为推演关系。在《逻辑研究》当中，胡塞尔认为研究这种推论系统最好的方法是从他们语言的表征开始。
那 么，如何分析这些句子和命题的语言表征呢? 胡塞尔的方法是首先从开始意识单位着手，也就是说，所有的命题应该被以话语者演讲的方式被表现出来，话语者在其中论述以及回答所提及的问题，就好像话语者 在上给学生上课。这些意识单位被胡塞尔认为是刻意行为或者刻意经验，因为他们总是代表了一些希望被展示出来的一面。而一个命题中总是有刻意的和非刻意的意 识单位。刻意意识之所以是刻意意识是因为它包含刻意的组成部分而非刻意的意识却没有。
甚至看无对象的刻意经验（例如“空”）也和思维中天马行空一样带有刻意成分。在胡塞尔看来，思维是缺乏对应对象的，而刻意行为就是把思维和对象以“仅仅好像是那个对象”链接起来，而不是确实是那个对象。胡塞尔反对认为，这些刻意经验只是思维内部表征外部对象的图样。
Even objectless (i.e., empty) intentional experiences like your thought of the winged horse Pegasus have content. On Husserl's view, that thought simply lacks a corresponding object; the intentional act is “merely as of”, but not really of, an object. Husserl rejects “representationalist” accounts of intentionality, such as the mental image theory, according to which intentional experiences represent intra-mental pictorial representations of objects, where like other pictures such images may exist without there being a depicted object in the actual world. For Husserl, this view leads to a “false duplication” of objects represented in the veridical case; and it already presupposes what an adequate conception of pictorial representation is yet to accomplish: an explanation of what it is that makes the underlying “phantasy content”, or phantasm, “the [r]epresenting image of something or other” (Husserl 1994, p. 347; Husserliana, vol. XXII, pp. 305f). It is precisely an intentional content that does the trick here (as in all cases of intentional consciousness), according to Husserl, in a way to be explained in more detail by his phenomenology of consciousness.
In the case of propositional acts, i.e., units of consciousness that can be given voice to by a complete sentence, Husserl identifies their content with the propositional meaning expressed by that sentence. In the case of their non-propositional but still intentional parts, he identifies the corresponding intentional content with a sub-propositional meaning. For example, the judgement “Napoleon is a Frenchman” contains an act of thinking of Napoleon whose intentional content is the sub-propositional meaning expressed by the name “Napoleon”. (Accordingly, the judgement can be looked upon as an act of ascribing the property of being French to the referent of that name.) Experiences like this, which can be given voice to by either a singular or a general term, are called “nominal acts” (as opposed to the propositional acts containing them). Their contents are called “nominal meanings”.
Husserl regards both propositional and nominal meanings as the subject-matter of “pure logic” or “logic in the wide sense”—the study of (i) what distinguishes sense (alias meaning) from nonsense (this part of pure logic being called “pure grammar”) and (ii) which of the senses delivered by pure grammar are logically consistent and which of them are not (this part of pure logic being labelled “logic in the narrow sense”).
An important and still largely unexplored claim of Husserl's is that any logically consistent meaning can in principle be subjectively fulfilled, more or less adequately, by a unified intuition, such as an act of continuous perception or intuitive imagination, where the structure and other essential features of the meaning in question can be read off from the respective mode of intuitive fulfillment. Inconsistent meanings can be singled out and studied by means of (reflection upon) corresponding experiences of intuitive conflict, like for instance the discrete switching back and forth between a duck-head-imagination and a rabbit-head-imagination in the case of an attempted intuitive imagination of a duck-head that is at the same time a rabbit-head. Some meanings are inconsistent for formal-logical reasons. According to Husserl, all analytically false propositions belong to this category. Other meanings are inconsistent because they conflict with some general material a priori truth, also called “essential law”. The proposition expressed by the sentence “There are perceptual objects whose surface is both (visibly) completely green and completely red at the same time” is a case in point.
Meanings generally and propositions in particular exist independently of their actually functioning as intentional content. Thus, true propositions such as the Pythagorean theorem can be discovered. Propositions and their components are abstract, i.e., atemporal, objects. However, what does it mean to grasp a proposition or, more generally, a sense? How can an abstract object become the content of an intentional act? Combining ideas of Bolzano and Lotze, Husserl answers this question by taking recourse to the notion of an ideal (i.e., abstract) species or type, as follows. Propositions and other meanings are ideal species that can be (but do not have to be) instantiated by certain particular features, i.e., dependent parts, of intentional acts. Those species are also called “ideal matters”. The particular features instantiating an ideal matter—Husserl refers to them as “moments of matter”—are laid bare by phenomenological description, a reflection-based (or introspective) analysis taking into account both the linguistic expression(s) (if any) and the modes of (possible) intuitive fulfillment or conflict associated with the respective experience.
Since phenomenological description yields ideal species, it involves what Husserl was later (notably in Ideas) to call “eidetic reduction”, i.e., an unfolding of abstract features shared by appropriate sets of fictitious or real-life examples, by way, e.g., of free imaginative variation on an arbitrarily chosen initial example (for the method of “free variation”, see Experience and Judgement, sec. 87).
Phenomenological description also yields the “moment of quality” of the intentional experience under investigation, i.e., the particular feature instantiating its psychological mode (judgement, conscious deliberation, conscious desire, conscious hope, etc.), which roughly corresponds to the speech act mode of an utterance giving voice to that experience. Furthermore, the description yields relations of “foundation”, i.e., one-sided or mutual relative existential dependencies between (1) the experience in question and other experiences and (2) the particular descriptive features of the experience. Thus, an experience of pleasure about a given event is one-sidedly founded, relative to the stream of consciousness it belongs to, in a particular belief-state to the effect that this event has occurred. (The relativization to a particular stream of consciousness makes sure that both founded and founding experience occur in the same person's mind.) Like all foundation relations, this one holds in virtue of an essential law, to the effect that conscious pleasure about some state of affairs requires a corresponding (and simultaneous) belief. Quite generally, a given object a of type F is founded in a particular object b of type G (where a is different from b and F is different from G) relative to a particular whole c of type H if and only if (i) there is an essential law in virtue of which it holds that for any object x of type F there is an object y of type G and a whole z of type H, such that both x and y are (proper) parts of z, and (ii) both a and b are (proper) parts of c. Of course, the notion of an essential law needs further clarification.